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Abstract 
Global central banking is heading towards a qualitatively and quantitatively new age: one 
characterized by scientization, horizontal bureaucratic extension, committee decision-making, 
transparency and outcome performance. These developments resonate well with Max Weber’s 
concept of rationalization and they are expected to impact on how central banks engage in different 
modes of governance in transnational regulation, on how knowledge is being produced, and on how 
political accountability is being transformed. In general, the case of central bank scientization may 
be an early indicator of more general trends in global governance: the increased importance of 
normative, cognitive and imaginary governance, the blurring border between science and politics, 
and the objectification of power structures. 
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The Fifth Age of Central Banking in the Global Economy 
Central banks across the world are embedded in a variety of national contexts and histories, and, to 
different degrees, they are exposed to a multitude of challenges that require learning and adaptation 
in very specific situations. Globalization, regional integration processes, financial crises, wars and 
terrorist attacks impact differently on different central banks and, in most cases, central banks 
themselves feel that these challenges make flexibility and change indispensable. Seen in that light, 
we would not expect that central banks across the globe display isomorphic characteristics. Central 
bankers do indeed model each other’s practices, structures and ideologies. However, they do not 
copy these features one-to-one. Rather, they translate institutional fashions from other contexts into 
a format that resonate with existing domestic structures, relations and ideas. Emulation does not 
necessarily imply institutional convergence. Indeed, in preparation of major institutional reform a 
comparative study commissioned by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand concluded that in the 1980s 
“there was little commonality among central banks in their precise functions, objectives, or even the 
question of who should set the objectives. The evidence was that few central banks at the time had 
well-defined, stable, objective functions.”i And it has been argued that central bankers are an “oddly 
assorted bunch. Many national idiosyncrasies persist that may no longer have a place, though ... 
these may have deeper roots than many people assume.”ii 
Despite the obvious danger of oversimplification I will neglect many of the differences that indeed 
exist and continue to exist between central banks. Rather, I will raise the level of abstraction to such 
an extent that central banks and the art of central banking are analyzed as categories in their own 
right. I will adopt a so-called macro-historical perspective on central banks and central banking with 
a view to spelling out some of the commonalities that exist in the world of central banking. The 
purpose of this exercise is to try to substantiate a claim about where central banks are at the 
moment and whereto they are heading. In short, I will claim that central banking is on its way into 
an entirely new age, characterized by scientization, horizontal bureaucratic extension, external 
communication, collective decision-making and outcome management. I conclude that Max 
Weber’s concept of rationalization that includes a striking intellectualization of the world; an 
objectification of things and actions via formal analysis and mathematical abstraction; a technical 
mastery via specialized practices and discourse; and reification (or thingification) of policies, power 
relations and institutions describe well the development. 
The scope of this paper allows me to present a so-called “plausibility probe,” i.e. an argument that 
intuitively sounds plausible and puzzling and ought to be dealt with in further and more detailed 
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empirical research. In the last part of the paper I will discuss which possible implications 
scientization will have for transational governance, knowledge production and accountability. 
 
Global Trends in Central Banking 
It is common practice among central bank historians to distinguish between four stages in the 
development of central banking.iii In a first stage, special banks were created by governments to 
raise loans for the government; typically to be able to cover war expenditures. These central banks 
also regulated and took responsibility for the issuing of notes. In a second stage, central bankers 
were defined as the sort of entities that we recognize today as central banks proper. Central banks 
started to become banks to other banks, and thus accepting the responsibility for the stability of the 
financial system. Central bank were sometimes the lenders of last resort and they were responsible 
for the management of the external value of the national currency. In a third stage, central banks 
were nationalized. They were entirely subordinated their government and merely implemented the 
general macro-economic policy. Monetary policy had multiple goals such as full employment, 
economic growth, price stability, and a stable exchange rate. Finally, in a fourth stage, central banks 
were given formal autonomy to pursue a single objective, most typically price stability. Central 
banks maintained their currency function and responsibility for the overall stability of the financial 
system (although their supervisory functions vary from country to country). 
According to established knowledge in the area, the shift from the first to the second stage can be 
explained by the gradual development of private banking and the consequent risk of bank failure. 
The government’s bank simply had to take on additional functions to assist in situations of financial 
default, sometimes as lender of last resort. The shift from the second to the third stage, and from the 
third to the fourth stage, can be accounted for by the consecutive crises in the form of economic 
depression and two world wars. With that background in mind, this article raises the question 
whether globalization has implied that yet another stage in the development of worldwide central 
banking is taking form? In other words, is there enough empirical evidence to suggest that it is 
plausible that central banking is undergoing yet another paradigmatic change, moving into a so-
called fifth age (Table 1)? 
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Table 1: Central Banking Throughout the Ages 
 First age 
1600s-1800s 
Second age 
1873-1914 
Third age 
1930s-1970s 
Fourth age 
1980s-1990s 
Fifth age? 
2000s 
Regime 
Mercantilism/colbertist 
nationalism 
Gold standard/ 
Laissez faire 
internationalism 
Bretton 
Woods/ 
Keynesian 
nationalism 
Washington 
consensus/ 
Monetarist 
internationalism 
Post-
Washington 
consensus/ 
transnationalism 
Arena shifting Few state-owned 
central banks around 
De facto 
autonomous 
central banking 
Integrated 
central 
banking 
Formally 
autonomous 
central banking 
Scientization 
Bureaucratic 
scope Small – disparate 
Establishment 
of basic 
structures 
Building up Building down  Building out (alliances) 
Decision-
making 
Subdued the will of the 
principal Discretionary 
Public service 
machine 
bureaucracy. 
Process 
administration 
Let managers 
manage. 
Business and 
output 
management 
Committees and 
outcome 
management 
Communication Non-existent Non-existent Legalistic – formalistic Techno-speak Transparency 
Targets Servicing the state and its war-economy 
Currency 
stability 
Multiple 
goals – 
internal and 
external 
Monetary 
targeting 
Inflation 
targeting 
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The first four ages and macro-historical pendulum swings 
It is always dangerous to talk about institutional reform in terms of pendulum swings between two 
poles. It gives the impression that there exists only a limited set of reform options, and that ongoing 
reforms are only replications of past practices. However, if we have in mind that a pendulum is 
never swinging back to exactly the same position from where it came, the history of central bank 
reform can indeed be understood as one of pendulum swings from one fashion to the next.iv 
 
Figure 1: Pendulum Swings of Fashions and Practices 
 
Integrated 
central banking 
Mercantilism 
1500-1700 
Classical Gold Standard – 
laissez faire 
1873-1914 
War 
New Gold Standard 
1925-1936 
War 
Bretton Woods 
Imbedded liberalism 
1947-1971 Washington Consensus: neo-
liberalism, 1980s 
Post Washington consensus: 
Embedded neo-liberalism, 
2000- 
Legal independence 
Behavioral independence 
Independent 
central banking 
? 
1st Age 
2nd Age 
3rd Age 
4th Age 
5th Age 
? Rationalization and 
scientization transcending 
politics, 
2000- 
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Figure 1 illustrates that within the area of central banking the institutional standing of central banks 
has oscillated between an ideal-typical situation in which central banking has been “formally 
integrated” into the state apparatus, and an ideal-typical situation in which central banking had a 
formally de-coupled and “independent status” in relation to the rest of the state apparatus. Going 
into the concrete practice of central banking, however, will reveal that one thing is what is formally 
written into the statutes of the central bank (legal independence), and quite another thing may be 
how independence is being experienced in day-to-day policy-making (behavioural independence). 
Over the last three to four centuries, behavioural and legal independence only seem to have 
coincided three times. In addition to these complications, it could be added that all central banks, 
disregarding their formal statuses, most of the time have an interest in working actively with, and 
not always against, the rest of the state apparatus. No organization can afford to run the risk to be 
completely without allies, either in parliament, in government or in society at large. In other words, 
“central banks, whatever their statutory relationship with government, are unlikely to deviate far 
from the domestic political consensus about appropriate action.”v 
The first two central banks in existence, the Swedish Riksbank (1668) and the Bank of England 
(1694) were created by the state, for the state. It was not until the classical gold standard (1873-
1914) that the stability-culture, which has been at the core of central bank activity until the present 
day, involved a considerable degree of behavioural independence of the concerned central banks. 
This was the golden era of central banking. Not only were the most important functions of the 
central bank metier invented, it was also a period in which typically conservative and liberal 
governments pursued a laissez-faire policy. Although the central banks, as a general rule, were not 
legally independent they behaved in distinct independent ways. With the approval of national 
politicians the central banks pursued an external stability objective, i.e. defend the stability of the 
national currency vis-à-vis a certain amount of gold. Internal stability, i.e. the pursuance of 
employment and growth, only came second. 
World War I abruptly ended the golden era of central banking. Everywhere in Europe the working 
classes started to organize themselves much more effectively than was seen hitherto. Through trade 
unions and social democratic parties they required political influence and, which is important in this 
regard, a changed perspective on the political priorities. In fact, the consensus about external 
stability first and internal stability second was turned upside-down. During the war, a large number 
of barriers for the free movement of capital and goods had been introduced. In many places these 
were maintained after the war. The so-called “first globalization” had come to an end. 
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During the 1930s, the worldwide recession put a definitive end to central bank independence. The 
central banks and their stability culture were often accused of being the main sources of 
unemployment, social unrest and extreme political ideologies. Another war broke out in that climate 
of depression and, towards the end of World War II, the consensus was now tipping towards 
“embedded liberalism.” Accordingly, the focus on external stability should not prevent states from 
promoting employment and growth on their own territories. After the war, many central banks were 
nationalized and policy makers, with the help from the most recent scientific advances, more 
actively wanted to steer the societal machinery in a much more detailed way than was seen hitherto. 
It was Keynesianism that was taught at university. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, a row of complicated factors – mistaken sheltering strategy in the 
face of the petrol shocks, change of monetary doctrine by Fed Governor Paul Volcker, the accession 
to power of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Milton Freedman’s intellectual diplomacy, idea 
diffusion by the OECD, neoliberal think tanks and the financial media – provided national policy-
makers with a new paradigmatic set-up for their economic policies. Governments that came to 
power in the first part of the 1980s – whether Liberal, Conservative or Social democratic – were 
offered a complete ideational set-up as a replacement to old and discredited thinking. Signalling 
credibility and stability to the financial markets preoccupied national politicians everywhere. The 
“second globalization” was soon a reality and a new golden era for central bankers emerged in the 
1980s and 1990s with legal independence matching their behavioural independence. 
The issue at this stage is to discuss whether we are witnessing empirical developments that 
somehow justify that it makes sense to talk about a new pendulum swing back in favour of more 
integrated central banking? Alternatively, it may be that the pendulum metaphor is unable to 
conceptualize present developments and that the pendulum has started to swing in a completely 
different direction! Is a Post-Washington consensus emerging according to which social relations 
ought to be embedded in democratic political institutions or is central banking simply transcending 
politics by way of rationalization and scientization? 
 
The Fifth Age: Significant Global Trends 
Which key trends are so significant and general in scope that they contribute to laying the 
foundation to a qualitatively and quantitatively new stage in the development of central banking? 
Attention will be directed towards five such trends that together may add up to constituting an 
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entirely new world of central banking: scientization, horizontal bureaucratic extension, collective 
decision-making, external communication and outcome management. 
Scientization. Whereas the 1990s were characterized by a worldwide upsurge in organizational 
reform enhancing the instrument autonomy of central banks, i.e. freedom from being supervised by 
political authorities in the process of implementing monetary and financial policies, the 2000s seem 
to be characterized by scientization. In the previous decade, monetary and, to the extent that bank 
supervision was in the hands of central bankers, financial policy-making were depoliticized. These 
two areas of policy-making were shielded from what was seen to be short-termish political 
considerations. The arena for ideological debate and political deliberation shifted away from the 
world of central banking towards other areas of political life. Central banking was somehow 
exempted from ordinary democratic decision-making. 
In the present years, however, central banking is becoming increasingly apoliticized. Max Weber 
referred to this process as being one of “rationalization” – ideology is being displaced by science, 
central bankers gain legitimacy and authority by constantly basing their views on and excessively 
applying the language of science. Human affairs are being reduced to “calculable, cold, hard, 
“matter-of-factneess,””vi which lies outside – indeed transcends - the sphere of political action. 
Scientization implies that power is being concentrated in the hands of those who master the 
discourse of science, scientistic technospeak. Central banking is becoming a matter for intellectuals, 
thereby implying that it is an elite phenomenon with which elected politicians would not even 
consider to deal.vii It is being dehumanized, eliminating personal ideological and emotional features 
that escape calculation. In line with Max Weber’s portrayal of the ideal typical civil servant, central 
bankers are being presented and do indeed present themselves as passionless machines and 
specialists without spirit. 
Scientization which apoliticizes the art of central banking is fundamentally different from 
autonomization which depoliticizes central banking. Autonomous central banking does not imply 
that media and politicians and other opinion-makers do not care about or pay attention to the metier 
of central bankers, but scientization does. Autonomous central banking does not imply that central 
bankers automatically are considered to be right when they make decisions, scientization does. And 
autonomization does not imply that central bankers are being uncritically listened to as the Delphi 
oracle, even when they speak out about matters that lie far beyond the narrow field of monetary and 
financial policy, but scientization does. 
Of course, the claim here is not that central banking is “scientistic.” Whereas genuine science is 
open-ended, keeping alive a continuing conversation between theory and practice not attempting to 
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close debates and not presenting general, everlasting truths about human affairs, central banking 
seems to be “scientific” representing a closed scientism which is “self-confirming, essentially an 
ideology or dogma presented in the guise of science.”viii 
Scientization expresses itself on many dimensions of central banking. Central bankers start to make 
epistemic alliances with other members of the scientific brotherhood (building out); co-incidence, 
prejudices and discretion are being filtered out of decision-making in an instrument rational manner 
(collective decision-making); procedures are being made to minimize haphazardly and random 
reactions to central bank decision-making - irrational exuberance (transparency and 
communication); and measurable performance is based on few and exact standards (inflation 
targeting). 
Building out. The first central banks were established more than three hundred years ago, but the 
real upsurge in central bank institutions proper took place in the interwar years and the world has 
seen a steady increase in the number of central bank institutions since then. Indeed, “[if] the 
fundamental, evolutionary criterion of success is that an organization should reproduce and multiply 
over the world, and successfully mutate to meet the emerging challenges of time, then central banks 
have been conspicuously successful.”ix Today almost all sovereign states in the world have 
established a central bank. It has become a sign of statehood on the same level as a national hymn, 
flag and army.x 
With the politicization of central banking in the immediate post WWII period, most central banks 
were charged with additional functions and grew considerably in size. Together with the rest of the 
national public administration, the number of personnel, departments, sections and administrative 
levels continued to grow. Central banks were building up their administrative structure. Integrated 
central banking could be characterized as a paternalistic, formalistic and hierarchical machine 
bureaucracy, in which employees had steady career prospects and where form and process mattered 
more than substance. The global wave of New Public Management changed all that. Everywhere 
central bank organizations went through considerable trimming – building down. It became an 
objective in itself to measure the success of central bank organizational reform in relation to the 
number of employees that were asked to leave the organization. Modernization became 
synonymous with down-sizing. The administrative and management culture changed as well. 
Whereas in the immediate post WWII period central banks were considered to be distinct public 
administrations, during the 1980s and 1990s they were considered to be businesses in their own 
right, or a subspecies of the category of state-owned enterprises. Managers where asked to manage 
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their business, and each individual where evaluated on his or her ability to perform, i.e. to deliver a 
certain kind of output in time according to contractual obligations. 
As a result of scientization and rationalization in the 2000s, this may be changing! As epistemic 
communities, central banks work in entirely different ways. They are opening up their distinct 
knowledge networks to like-minded allies, and closing off their relations to the uninitiated. 
Organizational boundaries are blurring, and so are territorial and cultural boundaries. Today, central 
banks are neither building up nor down, they are simply building out. They form collegial alliances 
in the national as well as in the global organizational field. Hierarchies are being broken down, and 
co-equal central bankers work closely together from project to project. Interesting and influential 
allies are being sought, preferably among those actors on the global institutional field of monetary 
policy-making who share central bank notions of rationality. Veritable transnational, epistemic clan 
structures or communities may be emerging in the world of central banking. Such a development 
does not require less personnel (building down), but it does require a different sort of personnel 
possessing doctoral degrees in economics, that engage directly and actively with the scientific 
community. Slowly we will see that research departments in central banks are being established, 
expanding and taking on prestigious positions in central banks. We will notice that central bankers 
create scientific working paper series and finance their own scientific journals, and that 
management is being recruited from universities. Within the central bank scientific credentials will 
be effective career enhancing factors. 
Committee decision-making. The history of central banking has typically been written with a 
particular focus on strong, decisive men that created, consolidated and defended the integrity and 
autonomy of their institution. One scholar concluded that “[t]hroughout the Fed’s history, its power 
over the economy has depended more on the political leadership of its chairman than on any other 
factor.”xi Bank of England Governor, Montagu Norman as well as a long series of Fed Chairmen 
are being presented as superhuman beings that constitute strong elements of these two central 
banks’ institutional legacies as well as role models for central bankers across the world. Throughout 
most of his governorship, Fed Chairman Greenspan, for instance, simply personified the central 
bank institution, not by law, but in practice.xii Thus, an ordinary member of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC), the main decision-making forum of the Federal Reserve System, holds 
that “[f]rankly, to this day I do not know if I ever actually influenced a FOMC decision in my five 
and a half years.”xiii In other countries, the role and responsibility of the central bank governor 
personally is spelled out in contractual form. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is a case in point. 
Alan Bollard and, before him, Don Brash, were since 1989 personally responsible for achieving the 
inflation targets established together with treasury. Because of that personal responsibility, it is also 
 11 
in the end the Reserve Bank’s governor, and only him, that make decisions about interest rate 
changes. Being unable to fulfil these stated objectives, the central bank governor can be fired by 
parliament. 
The focus on one-person performance may be changing now! Rationalization and scientization 
require that decisions cannot be left to charismatic individuals. Instrumental rationality 
(zweckrationalität) stands in contrast to value-rational (wertrationalität), affectual and traditional 
forms of social action. Therefore, it is just natural that collective decision-making is gaining ground 
in the world of central banking. In countries as different as UK, Japan, Sweden, Norway, 
Switzerland and Brazil, and many others, a monetary policy committee has been established. The 
same goes for the Committee-based European Central Bank that so far has replaced 12 central 
banks that used to be run by individual governors. No central bank that has collective decision-
making has so far replaced that form of internal consensus building with a one-man show. 
Over recent years, the increased depolitization of central banking to a large extent explains why 
such a major change in decision-making mode has taken place. When central banking was fully 
integrated into the state apparatus during most of the Bretton Woods period, there was not much 
point in establishing decision-making in committees. Governmental orders were not meant to be 
discussed, and even less criticized. The job of the governor was to carry out other peoples’ 
decisions rather than by making informed decisions of their own. With central bank autonomy 
flourishing in the 1990s, central banks themselves were made accountable for efficient and effective 
decision-making, and many central banks have, in recent years, shifted to collective deliberation to 
enhance the knowledge repertoire behind decisions and, not to forget, to spread out accountability 
on more persons than one. 
Arguments about the efficiency of decision-making, in contrast to arguments about representational 
democracy, are being applied in favour of collective decision-making in central banks. Indeed, 
some experimental research demonstrates that committees actually make better and more informed 
decisions than individuals.xiv Majority voting cancels out the worst performers in the committee and 
more knowledge is being shared. When Lars Svensson was asked to evaluate single-governor 
decision-making at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, this was exactly a point he brought up for 
discussion, and he thought that it ought to be changed. He “considered it risky for one individual to 
have so much power over monetary policy” and he recommended that a monetary policy committee 
was established.xv 
Transparency and communication. Many myths about central banking date back to the classical 
gold standard where central bankers themselves constructed the art of central banking in esoteric 
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and almost religious fashion keeping the functioning of the central bank temple as the best kept 
secret of all.xvi Thus, a legacy of the past is that central bankers, as a rule, do not interpret their role 
as consisting of communicating with the public on a regular basis or explaining their policies. No 
wonder that “central banks traditionally [have been] surrounded by a peculiar and protective 
political mystique.”xvii Speaking about central bankers, Milton Friedman once observed that they 
had two principal objectives “avoiding accountability on the one hand and achieving public prestige 
on the other.”xviii 
All this may be about to change! Today, there is a “general consensus among central bankers that 
transparency is not only an obligation for a public entity, but also a real benefit to the institution and 
its policies.”xix Again, within central banking efficiency arguments, rather than arguments about 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, drive the case for central bank transparency and external 
communication. Although central bankers duly recognize that their institution cannot exist in a 
vacuum cut off from public scrutiny they primarily spend their time on making the scientific case 
for how transparency can enhance the effectiveness of their monetary policies. In other words, in 
their own way central banks translate the globally accepted norm of “good governance,” which 
condemns secret and closed public administrations, to fit their own world. By way of targeted one-
way communication, central bankers do not communicate with a view to learning from or adapting 
whatever argument may be raised against central bank policies. On the contrary, such market 
insensitivity or “leaning against the wind” is helping central bankers to consolidate their reputation 
of integrity and autonomy on the financial markets. When central bankers talk, they talk with the 
financial markets, and not with the larger public. The argument is simple: central banks depend on 
financial and monetary markets to be effective and “rational.” If markets are irrational, it will 
become difficult for the central bank to lay down a monetary policy strategy that helps it to reach its 
stated goals. One way in which the central bank improves the rationality and effectiveness of the 
financial markets is that the bank reveals not only its policy decisions, but also the arguments and 
data leading to its decisions. The clearer the central bank is about what it is doing and why, the 
easier it becomes for the financial markets to form an opinion of how the short-term develops. If the 
financial markets are clear about the short term, then, it is argued, the central banker can more 
easily achieve its objective on the medium to long term. 
Central banks that have a long history of policy effectiveness and credibility do not necessarily need 
to talk as much as central banks with a low level of perceived credibility. That is “why “nouveau 
riche” institutions with poor credibility “talk,” and why institutions that have a great “wealth” of 
credibility can afford to whisper.”xx This may explain why, in Norway, a hitherto unheard degree of 
transparency has been adopted. The Governor, Svein Gjedrem has decided that his quarterly 
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inflation reports should contain projections of interest-rate levels three years into the future.xxi Other 
central banks plan to follow the trend in the name of transparency, but critics argue “that there is no 
point in announcing intentions for the future if that future is clouded in mystery.”xxii 
Increased and improved communication with the external world is, of course, closely connected to 
the habit of making decisions collectively rather than by individuals. Committee decision-making 
simply helps to open up the doors of the inner circles of the secret houses for professional central 
bank watchers in the financial media, stock exchanges and private banks. Transparency is also 
closely connected to the next global trend in central banking, inflation-targeting. In that regard, 
former Swedish central bank governor, Lars Heikensten argued that inflation targeting is being 
conducted now “almost by necessity with a high degree of openness and clarity.”xxiii  
Inflation targeting, i.e. the idea that the bank, typically together with the treasury of the country, 
decides on an acceptable range within which price inflation is allowed to settle, is now a world wide 
trend in central banking. Whereas, during the classical gold standard, central bankers were most 
interested in external stability, i.e. the value of the currency, central bankers in the post-WWII 
period were asked to pursue several objectives at once such as growth, employment, financial and 
price stability. During the late 1970s and the 1980s many central banks started to establish monetary 
targets, which is an arrangement under which the central bank aim for a certain rate of growth of the 
money supply. In the US, the idea of monetary targets entered political discourse in 1974, but it 
took until 1979 before it was implemented by Fed Chairman Paul Volcker and then only lasting a 
couple of years as a watered down kind of “pragmatic monetarism.”xxiv In practice, monetary policy 
was based on an eclectic use of economic theory. It proved to be incredible difficult to exactly 
determine what the money supply was, and which kind of impact it would have on price levels. 
A new era of targeting started when New Zealand, as a first mover, formally announced an inflation 
target in 1990. The New Zealanders as well as outsiders, having been used to double-digit inflation 
levels for more than two decades, thought the first targets agreed upon in March 1990, 0-2 per cent, 
seemed radical. However, already after two years the objective had been reached. Today, a very 
large number of the world’s central banks have adopted explicit or implicit inflation targets.xxv Both 
as professor of economics, ordinary member of the FOMC and now as Chairman of the Fed, Ben 
Bernanke has been an ardent supporter of inflation targeting.xxvi The IMF is now also taking an 
active part in diffusing the idea world-wide, as a result of which it has entered high on the agenda, 
not only among the largest and richest countries in the world, but also, and maybe particularly, 
among the poorest and most peripheral countries in the world, such as Albania, Botswana, 
Romania, Uganda and many others. 
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Former central bankers are sceptical. Paul Volcker, for instance, recently said that inflation 
targeting “is a little bit too tight for me. The inflation rate is bound to go up and down a little bit and 
it should go up and down a little bit.”xxvii Harvard professor Benjamin Friedman is also extremely 
reluctant to embrace inflation targeting: “By forcing the entire conversation to take place in terms of 
only one aspect of economic activity that the central bank and the government care about … 
inflation targeting tends to hide what the true objectives of the monetary policy are and therefore 
undermines transparency.”xxviii The debate is classical in central bank circles. It is one of 
discretionary policy making versus rule-based policy making.xxix Although inflation targeting can 
be seen as “constrained discretion,”xxx most analysts actually consider the explicit focus on one 
single performance criteria defined within a narrow band of fluctuation as an excessive breach with 
the extended discretion for which central bankers have fought over decades and actually obtained. 
When Congress established the Fed in 1913 the job was thought to be relatively automatic. The 
rule-based automaticity was supported by monetarist theory from the 1930s and onwards. From the 
1960s and onwards, however, consecutive Fed Chairmen made it a central feature of central 
banking to adopt a discretionary, holistic, eclectic and pragmatic approach to monetary policy-
making, i.e. not one that only focused on one single objective maintained within a narrow band.xxxi 
Targeting was not only considered to be an excessively constraining activity that could seriously 
undermine the utility of monetary policy, it was seen to be a threat to central bank independence, 
and, as we have seen, somehow a set-back for accountable policy-making in central bank circles. 
Furthermore, most recently, some of the first-movers as regards inflation-targeting, for instance 
Sweden, have in practice interpreted the targets in pretty flexible ways, which have made some 
commentators ask whether this is the beginning of the end for inflation targeting.xxxii 
However, inflation targeting can be seen as just another key-element of rationalization and 
scientization. By explicitly and strictly determining the criteria for success and failure, monetary 
policy-making is in many ways dehumanized. The scope for discretion and intuition – holistic and 
pragmatic central banking – is being narrowed down considerably, thereby confirming the external 
perception of central bankers as being one of passionless machines. The art of central banking is 
becoming objectified, thereby hiding the social character of monetary policy. The interests of real 
human beings and the political and power-related structures underlying central banking are being 
obscured by scientific and almost “divine” rules. An abstract and complex affair is simplified and 
objectified, made a thing rather than a malleable social relation (reification). Thus, reification may 
conceal everything which is actually arbitrary and socially changeable by representing it as 
immutably given.xxxiii As such, reification through scientization and rationalization could be 
considered an excellent form of social control, since those who may have a stake in central banking, 
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ordinary citizens as well as elected politicians, exercise self-control and self-censorship, rather than 
engaging in direct debate, and thereby helping to politicize central bankers. 
Scientization and rationalization may challenge our existing understanding of accountability, 
legitimacy, and power relations between civil servants and politicians. This is the subject for the 
next section. I will argue that the process of scientization may have consequences for how we 
conceptualize governance, for how and what kind of knowledge is produced, and for political 
accountability (Table 2). 
 
New Rules of the Game in Transnational Economic Governance 
Governance Transnationalization 
 Governance Communities  → Knowledge Communities 
 Political Governance  → Knowledge Governance 
Knowledge Production 
 Scientific Pluralism  → Scientific Overlay 
Civil Servant – Politician Relationship 
 Depolitization  → Apolitization 
 External accountability  → Internal Accountability 
Table 2: The Impact of Scientization on Governance, Knowledge and Accountability 
 
Scientization may imply that governance—the regulation of social behaviour—is being 
transnationalized, i.e. that a movement from territorial governor communities to non-territorial 
knowledge communities is taking place (Table 2). Central bankers have most of the time been 
involved in international cooperation. During the era of the Classical Gold Standard, international 
cooperation between central bankers was characterized by ad hoc and informal contacts. Since 
World War II, international cooperation has become formalized in a large number of international 
organizations and also globalized, in view of the fact that more and more countries are now 
involved in increasingly complex ways. 
Up till now, the many forums in which central bankers meet have been defined by their national 
members and the territory they represent. It has been possible to speak of communities of national 
central bank governors. International central bank forums have had a distinct territorial 
dimension—larger or smaller, depending on the number and type of members. Thus, international 
organizations such as these are fundamentally based on a territorial principle of organization and 
governance. This may now be changing! If it is true that scientization is taking hold of central 
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banking and that central bankers are merging to form a transnational knowledge community, 
territorial borders will cease to play a role and nonterritorial principles of organization and 
governance will start to become more descriptive of the field. Conflict structures and patterns of 
governance within a knowledge community do not respect territorial borders; they become supra-
territorial phenomena.xxxiv Cleavage structures are defined according to the rules of the scientific 
game: intra-paradigmatic quarrels about theory, methods, data etc. Knowledge communities are 
being constructed, partly replacing and partly supplementing or overlapping with governor 
communities. 
Governor communities consist of central bank governors who represent clearly demarcated 
territories. Knowledge communities, in contrast, include all scientists within a field—whether they 
are central bank personnel or not. A knowledge community may be broader or narrower in scope 
than a governor community, and knowledge communities are more dynamic and porous than 
governor communities. Membership of a knowledge community cannot be inherited in the same 
way as membership of a governor community. For instance, the governor of the Bundesbank will 
always be part of G10, but he will only be a member of the knowledge community as long as he 
continues to contribute to the generation of scientific knowledge. 
To a much larger extent than international governor communities, transnational knowledge 
communities will be inclined to exercise soft governance. Central bankers in knowledge 
communities are more in the business of producing rules of appropriateness, standards and 
guidelines – normative governance; knowledge and data – cognitive governance; as well as 
meaning, common histories, myths about the past and visions about the future – imaginary 
governance. So, it is also possible that a movement from political governance to knowledge 
governance is taking place as a result of scientization. Political governance can, for the sake of 
argument, be simplistically defined as using regulation to solve a concrete societal problem.xxxv The 
practical aspects of problem-solving – “the art of central banking” - rather than theorizing for the 
sake of theory – “the science of central banking” - have traditionally been central to the business of 
central banking. Theoreticians have not been held in high esteem in central bank circles, and it has 
been argued that the art of central banking is driven by intuition and life experience. Keynes, for 
instance, was viewed among central bankers as a distant theoretician, and Strong and Norman 
feared that people like him would overshadow the “practical bankers.”xxxvi 
This may no longer be the case, however! In contrast to political governance, knowledge 
governance can be defined as the production and dissemination of norms, knowledge and identity. 
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Central to knowledge governance is the idea that knowledge production is an objective in itself, i.e., 
more knowledge is better than less knowledge! 
Related to the development of knowledge governance is the question of what knowledge is and 
which aspects of knowledge should be expanded through intensified and systematic research. It is 
possible that scientization within central banking implies a movement from scientific pluralism to 
strategic overlay of particular research disciplines and approaches. Since central banks in many 
cases provide for their own income and to a large degree have a free hand when it comes to 
spending that money, and since central bankers tend to spend considerable amounts of money on a 
few areas of research activity, one would expect to see a noticeable expansion of research activity in 
some areas of research rather than others. Through the massive injection of central bank money into 
research activities in delimited fields of research many more actors will suddenly become players in 
the field of generating knowledge within a particular subset of macro-economic research. In other 
words, the scientization of central banking may cause a bias in research focus, since very few other 
sources of research funding, private or public, will be able to match the cash flow emanating from 
central bank circles. It is difficult to predict whether this potential research bias will have enduring 
consequences for the development of the economic sciences in particular and the social sciences in 
general, but it is to be expected that the scientific disciplines of most relevance to central bankers 
will tend to play a dominant role in the overall field of macro-economic research. 
By the same token, just as specific scientific disciplines can become overemphasized by an 
extraordinary injection of funding, so can specific scientific approaches. The new impetus to macro-
economic research may have an impact on the scientific discourse in general and, consequently, 
also on which approaches are considered to be marginal/peripheral and which are considered to be 
central/important. Since the new actors in the knowledge game are relatively well financed and 
since it may reasonably be expected that they will have quite a narrow agenda, central bankers may 
be able to dictate the kind of discussions held in certain disciplines. Within the field of research on 
monetary policy, some voices in the ongoing academic debate may be strengthened while others 
become weaker. If central banking ideas about achieving stability via sound money, finances, and 
institutions have achieved the status of hegemony, this status can only be expected to be further 
consolidated by additional funding in its favour. 
Within central bank circles, this power to actually influence the entire research climate and the 
conditions of research is fully recognized and even valued. The Swedish central bank governor held 
that “[s]everal of my academic contacts have stressed how valuable the contact with the central 
bank world is for their research.”xxxvii The most recent evaluation report of ECB research, for 
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instance, argued that the benefits to be attained by a central bank from engaging actively in 
academic research included the fact that the central bank “can stimulate and encourage external 
research on issues of interest to the central bank through publications, conferences, and consulting 
relationships.”xxxviii The “powerhouse of research,” the European Central Bank itself, has ostensibly 
already grasped the overall idea behind the concept of research management since it “uses its 
research capacity to encourage, coordinate, and lead research efforts of the national central banks of 
the Eurosystem.” xxxix And this is not in vain! The evaluation concludes that “[g]iven its place at the 
centre of a continental system of central banks, it is not surprising that the ECB has already had a 
major effect on academic discourse throughout Europe.”xl 
Scientization of central banking may also impact on the power relationship between civil servants 
and politicians, typically in favour of the unelected civil servant, i.e. the central banker. As 
mentioned, one result of scientization may be a movement from depolitization to apolitization of the 
civil servant-politician relationship. First, scientization consolidates the autonomous status of civil 
servants by objectifying monetary policy-making. It becomes “unthinkable” to start a political 
argument with a civil servant that possesses recognized scientific authority. Rather, to boost their 
own credibility, politicians might instead tend to socialize with and even publicly flatter the civil 
servant in question. 
Second, scientization implies that civil servants with recognized scientific authority are encouraged 
to engage in policy issues and domains that are not part of their primary area of responsibility. The 
functions and responsibilities of the civil servant grow exponentially with the degree of 
scientization. This may take two forms. One is the case where the central banker on his own 
initiative start to engage in questions related to education policy, public administrative reform, and 
even cultural matters. Thus, researchers employed in the European Central Bank do not hesitate to 
express criticism with regard to the efficiency of the public sector in various European countries.xli 
In an American context, Chairman Greenspan earned a notorious reputation for speaking out loud 
on issues that are far beyond the authority of the Federal Reserve, including those that are 
politically contentious. Another form is the case where politicians and media alike on their own 
initiative consult central bankers on questions that are only marginally related to the art of central 
banking. This may take place in various hearings or in other public spheres. 
Thirdly, scientization has an impact on the mode and type of communication taking place in the 
political sphere. Apolitization through scientization means that the entire language of public 
administration is changing. In contrast to political and administrative statements, a major 
characteristic of scientific statements “is that they are privileged in the sense that, if derived in 
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accordance with scientific procedures, they are considered to give greater assurance of truth. It is 
more useful if conclusions on, say, what works and what does not work in government are scientific 
because scientific propositions are understood to be more reliable.”xlii In other words, scientized 
civil servants become immune to political argumentation because only the language of science is a 
valid means of communication. 
All of these considerations suggest that the locus of accountability in central banking may be about 
to change. We may see a movement from external to internal accountability. Whereas before, 
central bankers were accountable to the financial markets (during the 1990s) and politicians (during 
Bretton Woods), central bankers are increasingly accountable, first and foremost, to their scientific 
colleagues within the knowledge community. In knowledge communities, central bankers can only 
enhance their legitimacy and authority by complying with a number of scientific standards and by 
subjecting themselves to continuous peer review processes. 
Whereas before, central bankers were obliged to communicate broadly with politicians, citizens, 
and the financial markets, nowadays their communication is increasingly limited to communicating 
with their peers. In doing so, they apply an arcane scientific terminology that excludes a large 
number of people—including many economists. Thus, the current fashion in central banking circles 
for engaging in a debate about how central banks should talk or whether it is a good or a bad thing 
that central bankers talk should not be interpreted as a general attempt to open the business of 
central banking to the broader public or to elected politicians. 
 
The 5th Age: From “Art” to “Science” 
Do scientization and rationalization constitute a qualitatively and quantitatively new era for central 
banking, making the pendulum metaphor hitherto applied to describe central banking inappropriate? 
Is central banking developing from being an “art” to becoming a “science”? As emphasized, 
throughout this article, Max Weber pointed to rationalization as a mega-trend of modern society, 
embodied in the reality of public administration. Later, in the 1970s, Gouldner argued that public 
administration is on its way to becoming fundamentally scientized.xliii Thus, scientization as a 
phenomenon is, strictly spoken, not a revolutionary new phenomenon. It may not even adequately 
describe the world of central banking in all detail. However, there may be three solid reasons for 
why it is worthwhile paying attention to elements of scientization in central banking. A first reason 
concerns the role of the state in the globalized world. As the reality of globalization is taking form 
the state is embarking on new roles and functions, new actors continue to pop up on the global 
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scene for governance, and a multitude of authoritative governance instruments are being applied. In 
this situation, the possible scientization of central banking might be an early indicator of what is 
maybe becoming a more general phenomenon in global governance, i.e. that the production of 
knowledge, norms and identity, rather than the production of traditional, enforceable regulation, is 
what matters. Scientization can simply be seen as a new mode of governance in transnational 
regulation, according to which rational, technical and objectified knowledge stands central for the 
authoritative allocation of goods in society. 
Second, it is worth paying attention to the nascent scientization of central banking because it 
problematizes the relationship between science producers and science consumers. The literature on 
epistemic communities tends to view these two spheres as separate, i.e. scientific knowledge is 
injected into the policy process from outside in situations of uncertainty with a view to helping 
policy-makers to construct meaning. The case of central bank scientization illustrates that those who 
produce science are not easily distinguished form those who consume science. Science and politics 
are not easily disassociated. Central banks do not necessarily produce relevant, open, debatable and 
testable science. But they do indeed obtain a certain level of authority by presenting themselves as 
true scientists. Likewise, elected politicians seem to have tacitly agreed to leave large trunks of 
macro-economic policy-making to the discretion of unelected bureaucrats. This delegation of power 
can be justified in the name of science and it conveniently shifts responsibility for a problematic 
political arena away from the sphere of interest of elected politicians. The matter is objectified and, 
therefore, no longer an art subdued to the discretion of individuals, but rather a science subdued to 
generalizable rules for the social world. 
Finally, and connected to this latter point, a critical study of the case of central bank scientization 
helps us unravel the objectification of power structures. By doing so, we may better understand why 
national, regional and global governance structures suffer from democratic deficits. If monetary 
policy is somehow transcending politics, lifted out of the political game all together, how can 
support and demand then be channelled into the formulation, adoption and implementation of 
monetary policy? David Eastons’ systems perspective simply assumed that policy issues are salient 
and that concerned individuals and groups would attempt to channel their demands and support into 
the political system. Scientization and rationalization suggest that it may not be the case that 
interested parties engage in politics at all, particularly if the contentious issues and procedures are 
being brought beyond politization into the world of pseudo science, hidden in techno-speech and 
reserved for the few initiated. Scientization points to the need for uncovering these processes with a 
view to repoliticizing monetary policies and bringing politics back in. 
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